Advanced Evolutionary Games Module
David K. Levine
link to class schedule
1.
Introduction
2.
Hegemony, State Power and the Fall of Civilizations
Acemoglu and Robinson [2011]
Why Nations Fail
Levine and Modica [2012]: Conflict and the Evolution of Societies
3.
Calibrated Learning, No-regret, Universal Consistency and Convergence to Equilibrium
Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [2014]: "Learning with Recency Bias"
Foster, D. P. and P. Young [2006]: "Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium,"
Wharton
4.
Basic Evolutionary Theory
Kandori, M., G. Mailath and R. Rob [1993]: “Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games,”
Econometrica
, 61: 27-56
Young, P. [1993]: “The Evolution of Conventions,”
Econometrica
, 61: 57-83
Morris, S., R. Rob and H. Shin [1993]: “p-dominance and Belief Potential,”
Econometrica
, 63: 145-158
Ellison, G. [1995]: “Basins of Attraction and Long Run Equilibria”
5.
Advanced Theory of Evolution
more hegemony
Levine, D. K. and S. Modica [2014]: "Interim and Long-Run Dynamics in the Evolution of Conventions"
Problems for review
Problems for exam