Economic and Game Theory
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<P><FONT COLOR="#000000" SIZE=2 FACE="Courier New">According to the literature on social norms, a society can end up in a "desirable" equilibrium (for instance, without overexploitation of natural resources) without formal incentives for "desirable" behavior, because people seek approval from their peer groups.</FONT></P> <P><FONT COLOR="#000000" SIZE=2 FACE="Courier New">Casual observation shows that these mechanisms are particularly strong in professions where "heroic" attitudes are important (obviously, armies, but one could also think of fire brigades or police departments). Some people have argued that the introduction of formal incentive schemes in such organisations could "destroy" the informal value system and move the organisation to a "bad" equilibrium. For instance, some analysts (mainly historians) of the Vietnam war have argued that the introduction of systems analysis and formal management systems in the American Army have fundamentally changed American officers attitudes away from fighting to merely managing the war.</FONT></P> <P><FONT COLOR="#000000" SIZE=2 FACE="Courier New">Is anybody aware of existing work that has formalized this idea?</FONT> </P> <P><FONT SIZE=2 FACE="Arial">Laurent Franckx, MSc</FONT> <BR><FONT SIZE=2 FACE="Arial">Department of Economics and Management</FONT> <BR><FONT SIZE=2 FACE="Arial">Royal Military Academy</FONT> <BR><FONT SIZE=2 FACE="Arial">Renaissancelaan, 30</FONT> <BR><FONT SIZE=2 FACE="Arial">1000 Brussel</FONT> <BR><FONT SIZE=2 FACE="Arial">Belgium</FONT> <BR><FONT SIZE=2 FACE="Arial">Laurent.Franckx@egeb.rma.ac.be</FONT> </P> </BODY> </HTML> [Manage messages] |