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Respond to the question: IC mechanism design when players can vet?

11/14/2003 10:08 AM by name withheld; IC mechanism design when players can veto options
Hi,

I was looking into designing a mechanism that is incentive compatible when players have the ability to 'block' or veto outcomes (I had an application I wanted to use the mechanism in). This seems simple enough e.g clarke tax. However, I think I can prove that there exist no groves mechanism that can be made individually rational in this context while maintaining IC. Someone must have looked at mechanisms in this context before.... Does anyone have any pointers to references? Thanks for your help. [Manage messages]