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12/26/2004 08:22 AM by name withheld; Strategy:: try Myerson's Game Theory (p.65-67)

section 2.7 on Common Knowledge. [View full text and thread]

11/30/2004 03:24 PM by name withheld; answer to Strategy?

Ok, they are 7 men who are hung. If there were only 1, her wife of the adulterer would know it inmediately, since she would observe 0 adulteries knowing there has been one. If there were 2 adulteries, each of the wifes would observe 1 [View full text and thread]

11/30/2004 03:09 PM by name withheld; Answer to Strategy?

I guess all the men are hung. No one observes adultery, since no one is unfaithful after day 0. Since all wifes do not see after day 0 any adultery, but they know that there has been one. No men are hung on day 1 and the only men they [View full text and thread]

11/20/2004 09:28 PM by name withheld;

haha I'm pretty sure the answer is yes [View full text and thread]

11/12/2004 01:47 AM by SJ; Strategy

Hello,

I have come across a question that has temporarily stumped me:

There is a kingdom, with a number of couples living in the kingdom. On day 0, the king announces that some men in the kingdom have committed adultery, and that any woman who can prove (logically) at any time that her husband has committed adultery can present the proof at sundown and have him hanged at dawn the next day. Each woman has observed the actions of all men except for her own husband and can observe hangings. If any woman can deduce that her husband has committed adultery she would indeed like to see him hanged. (No adultery takes place after Day 0.) The preferences and structure of information are common knowledge: everyone knows them, and they know that everyone else knows them, etc.At dawn on the seventh morning, some men are hanged. How many and why?

I appreciate your assistance and would be very interested in your reply.

Sincerely,

SJ [Manage messages]