Advanced Evolutionary Games Module

1. Basic Evolutionary Theory

• Kandori, M., G. Mailath and R. Rob [1993]: “Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games,” Econometrica, 61: 27-56
• Young, P. [1993]: “The Evolution of Conventions,” Econometrica, 61: 57-83
• Morris, S., R. Rob and H. Shin [1993]: “p-dominance and Belief Potential,” Econometrica, 63: 145-158
• Ellison, G. [1995]: “Basins of Attraction and Long Run Equilibria”

2. Social Norms and Evolution

• Kandori, M. [1992]: “Social Norms and Community Enforcement,” Review of Economic Studies, 59: 61-80
• Johnson, P., D. K. Levine and W. Pesendorfer [1999]: “Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game" Journal of Economic Theory, 100: 1-22

3. Self Referential Games

• Howard, J. [1988]: “Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Theory and Decision, 24: 203-213.
• Levine, D. K. and B. Szentes [2006]: "Can A Turing Player Identify Itself?," Economics Bulletin, 1: 1-6
• Bachi, B., S. Ghosh and Z. Neeman [2011]: “Real Talk, Deception Equilibrium and Co-operation,” mimeo, Tel Aviv University.
• Kalai, A. T., E. Kalai, E. Lehrer, and D. Samet [2010]: “A Commitment Folk Theorem,” Games and Economic Behavior, 69: 127-137.
• Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1991]: "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, 54: 26-47.
• Juan I. Block and David K. Levine [2012]: "Codes of Conduct, Private Information, and Repeated Games"

4. Evolution in Self-Referential Games

• Levine, D. K. and W. Pesendorfer [2000]: "Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population"

5. Evolution of Institutions

• Acemoglu and Robinson [2011] Why Nations Fail
• Foster, D. P. and P. Young [2006]: "Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Wharton
• Levine and Modica [2012]: Conflict and the Evolution of Societies

Problem Set