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There are 6 NE in total, 4 pure and 2 mixed. For (seller,buyer), the pure NE are (1,1), (2,2), (3,1) and (3,3), which you can easily check by making a table and underlining best responses.
As for the mixed NE, the buyer should also [View full text and thread]
There are 6 NE in total, 4 pure and 2 mixed. For (seller,buyer), the pure NE are (1,1), (2,2), (3,1) and (3,3), which you can easily check by making a table and underlining best responses.
As for the mixed NE, the buyer should also [View full text and thread]
It is written that computing pure Nash equilibria in congestion games remains PLScomplete also when we restrict to affine delay functions. That is for dr(x) = arx + brx with, ar, br >= 0. Why is that? [View full text and thread]
Hey,
Would be amazing if somebody could solve this problem for me. I have no clue, to be honest. Here it is:
A seller and a buyer try to agree on the price of a Picasso painting. In the
rest of this exercsie, all the values and [View full text and thread]
Hey,
Would be amazing if somebody could solve this problem for me. I have no clue, to be honest. Here it is:
A seller and a buyer try to agree on the price of a Picasso painting. In the
rest of this exercsie, all the values and [View full text and thread]
Hey,
Would be amazing if somebody could solve this problem for me. I have no clue, to be honest. Here it is:
A seller and a buyer try to agree on the price of a Picasso painting. In the
rest of this exercsie, all the values and [View full text and thread]
Consider a classic signaling game (2 types, 2 actions) à la Spence. Suppose furthermore that there are two equilibria: one pooling, one separating. In the pooling eq., say, both types of senders send "Low". In the separating, the [View full text and thread]
Consider a classic signaling game (2 types, 2 actions) à la Spence. Suppose furthermore that there are two equilibria: one pooling, one separating. In the pooling eq., say, both types of senders send "Low". In the separating, the [View full text and thread]
Hi I'm dealing with a problem that has a slight twist to the lion and sheep problem. The problem is as follows
Lions  (1,2 ....K)
Sheeps  (1,2 ....K1)
Lion choose to ( Eat, not eat) sheep
If kth lion choose to eat, he becomes [View full text and thread]
This is a game theory question regarding the elections of a condo. [View full text and thread]
This is a game theory question regarding the elections of a condo. [View full text and thread]
This is a game theory question regarding the elections of a condo. [View full text and thread]
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n player has to decide a on fair numerical value x. Let's say this value is fair around f. All player write their value on a piece of paper face down. One of these values are selcted at random to be the actual value of x. But some [View full text and thread]
Hi All!
I was wondering if anyone could help me out with a game theory question:
My game involves two opposing players, M and W.
M’s objective is to pay the smallest amount. W’s objective is to gain the biggest amount.
M [View full text and thread]
Hi, in 1st Semester we have no Game Theory. Nevertheless this subject fascinates me.
My question in solving any matrices (2x2/3x3): As long I do not know, if players play WeakDominance > At 1st: I use [View full text and thread]
Hi Evreryone,
I am strugling to solve the third question of this exam. Can someone help me to solve it?
Basically, when I solve it I only find one NE ( i.e. Lr). This issue is that there are supposed to be many NE. I checked for [View full text and thread]
PLAYERS: A plaintiff and a defendant
THE ORDER OF PLAY:
1. The plaintiff decides whether to bring suit against the defendant at cost c.
2. The plaintiff makes a takeitorleaveit settlement offer of s>0.
3. The defendant accepts [View full text and thread]
